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Abstract. I discuss how Alain Badiou’s Logics of Worlds at-
tempts to rephrase his material dialectic philosophical project in
terms of topos theory. It turns out that his account restricts to the
so called local topos theory. In particular, his claim that categori-
cal change is not genuine is based on a constrained understanding
of topos theory. We then discuss his own ’postulate of materialism’
and demonstrate that it has two different interpretations depend-
ing on whether it is articulated in local or elementary topos theory.
While the main concerns in this paper are technical, we also ad-
dress the serious consequences of topos theory that weigh Badiou’s
philosophical project.
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Introduction
Alain Badiou, perhaps the most prominent French philosopher to-
day, is one of the key figures in dialectic materialism—a discourse that
has overshadowed the past century of continental philosophy after the
influence of radical social critique. But it is an interesting discourse
to contrast also with contemporary scientific materialism. Badiou’s
philosophy, which touches several key themes in contemporary mathe-
matics, can be interpreted as an endeavour in this direction.
Topos theory then plays a pivotal role to his argument. This is
not so much because of the exact way in which topos theory came to
geometrize and express categorically a new foundation to formal logic
and set theory. Instead, while arguing that mathematics ’is ontology’1,
he discovers Paul Cohen’s work in the incompleteness of set theory—a
precursor and a prelude to the categorical structural approach to the
’topos’ of mathematics. But still relying on set theory, Cohen’s work
is the only discourse of the ’subject’ of mathematics that Badiou does
respect.
This results with an interesting ambivalence. First, even if implicitly,
the most elementary structures of topos theory are already immersed
in Paul Cohen’s2 argument. Therefore, we can say that a ’topos’ plays
a pivotal role to the first one of Badiou’s two great treatises: Being
and Event. Lawere and Tierney then introduced topos theory in the
1970’s by making those structures, which are hiddenly immersed in
Badiou’s first argument, explicit. This resulted with something that
goes beyond Cohen’s original field of inquiry: an entirely new way to
view mathematics.
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By contrast, Badiou’s3 latter work Logics of Worlds can be viewed as
an attempt to support his own, still set-theoretic stand point over math-
ematical ’being’. Therefore, the precise beauty of his first argument—
Cohen’s work as a prelude to change—is condemned by the second
treatise. He must have discovered topos theory because of this ge-
nealogical connection that then inspired him to write the second trea-
tise in the first place. Even so, and because of this connection, he only
discovers a literature that restricts to local theory: something recon-
cilable from the point of view of set theory. Choosing to delimit his
discussion to this limited appearance is not as such a failure, of course:
Cohen’s argument can indeed be expressed as a local topos. However,
this in no way undermines the precursors to change that were already
immersed in Cohen’s intuition. Badiou, by contrast, seems obliged to
make a case against and to denounce the relevance of categorical tech-
niques which could make that prelude articulate. Therefore, he says,
the ’same mathematics’ still continues; that Grothendieck’s geometric
insight incorrigibly fails as a genuine event; that there is no change in
the ’way of doing mathematics’4.
This reductive, ’ontological’ decision is constitutive from the begin-
ning of his second argument, and any conclusions he draws on the ma-
teriality of phenomenology are to be read with caution. The basic line
of thought comes down to affirming the consequenct, that is, by show-
ing that some categories take a particular form while then suggesting
that all of them should do so.
In contrast, as we demonstrate, should we follow topos theory proper
there are two materially (mathematically) distinct conditions that only
locally—i.e. from the point of view of local topos theory, appear to re-
flect the same ’postulate of materialism’ which is pivotal to Badiou’s
phenomenological argument. We can say that a local topos is mate-
rially local in relation to set theory, whereas a more general one (the
so called Grothendieck-topos) satisfies conditions that make it material
over S ets but not in the constrained, ’local’ way. Faithful to Badiou’s
own vocabulary, we call the former, stronger condition an atomic ver-
sion of the postulate of materialism, whereas a Grothendieck-topos
satisfies only a weak version of the postulate. The weak version is not
logically bounded or constitutive: this suggests that ’Grothendieck’
does make a material difference
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Of course, Alexander Grothendieck himself has little to do with the
specific definition of a Grothendieck-topos, even if his insight stands
behind them at least in a simplistic way. Namely, such material, ele-
mentary topoi form the first but not the last step in generalizing math-
ematics beyond set theory. They are particularly important, however,
because they already articulate change in the way of doing mathematics
in a way that can be materially circumscribed from the point of view of
set thery. Grothendieck-topoi thus interestingly contrast with Badiou’s
own, ahistorical and ’pure’ situation of mathematical ontology.
To understand the difference between the two doctrines of material-
ism, we need a categorical point of view—an insight absent in Badiou’s
own work. Category theory, even if debatably, can be considered as an
alternative foundation to mathematics. In particular, if set theory is
based on the formal dialect of logic and, in that respect, can be con-
sidered as a ’dialectical’ one, category theory in contrast is based on
structural arguments and applies diagrams that have more geometric
meaning. In the context of post-structuralism—following Deleuze and
Foucault—it is intriguing to treat the categorical approach as a ’dia-
grammatic’ one as opposed to the ’dialectical’ reason behind set the-
ory. While topos theory then combines the two foundations by treating
’dialectics’ itself ’diagrammatically’, the focus shifts from syntax to se-
mantics : to the question of the meaning of that what Badiou treats as
the self-evident discourse of ’being’. In particular, it teaches us that
the problem of materiality itself is not inevitably a logically articulable
question.
As a brief historical overview, category theory was first introduced
by Samuel Eilenberg and Saunders Mac Lane during the 1940’s. In
result, various fields of mathematics including algebraic geometry and
geometric representation theory were revolutionarized. Philosophers
have paid little attention to this shift5, however, and in particular in
the structuralist shift in the focus of mathematics6.
Rather than standing itself as its new foundation, topos theory stands
at the cross-road of the two, dialectic and categorical paradigms through
which it intermediates the effects of change. To borrow Badiou’s own,
event-philosophical vocabulary, if category theory counts as an event,
topos theory deals with the local consequences that are then visible
also to set theory. It is not all clear, however, whether the categorical
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event was the cause behind this localization or whether it was actually
in set theory that something interesting did happen (as demonstrated
by Cohen). From the point of view of his own argument, it would
be meaningless to ask whether one of the two perspectives, ’top-down’
and ’bottom-up’ came first. As Badiou7 himself knows, the two always
occur in tandem.
To introduce this event from below—on the the local side of set
theory—Cohen did shows that there are sentences that are necessarily
undecidable: there are contrary, transitive denumerable models of set-
theory. We may choose one which verifies a certain statement while
another one disproves it. Lacking categorical insight, however, neither
Cohen nor Badiou could figure out how to think of such contradict-
ing models or situations together. Badiou’s philosophy could only deal
with the occurrence of the ’inconsistent’ as a ’generic’ decision, that
is, as a choice of only one among all situations S(♀). He thus believes
that one needs to choose which context to inhabit instead of residing
in and between many of them all at once. Topos theory, by contrast,
does use categorical techniques to specifically express the amalgam of
such situations so that the need to decide does not arise but possibly
afterwards. Badiou’s decision between situations then only emerges as
a (local) projection of that topos onto set theory. Such projections
(indicated by ♀) are in fact specific kind of geometric morphisms that
topos theorists refer to as a ’points’. It is not by accident that a ’de-
cision’ in Badiou’s vocabulary then stands for that precise procedure
through which category theorists ’make a point’. There is much syn-
ergy between dialectical and scientific modes of materialisms.
My question then concerns how precisely to correct the way in which
Badiou treats his point—the ’postulate of materialism’—and how to
express it in a categorically adequate way. Ironically, Badiou8 himself
claims that ’[i]f one is willing to bolster one’s confidence in the math-
ematics of objectivity, it is possible to take even further the thinking
of the logico-ontological, of the chiasmus between the mathematics of
being and the logic of appearing’. He further quotes Jean Dieudonne´
by saying that to earn the ’right’ to speak ’one must master the ac-
tive, modern mathematical corpus’9. Failure to do so leads to several
philosophical issues that we also briefly discuss in the end of this pa-
per. Sections 1–5 focus on Badiou’s own formalism. Sections 6–11 shift
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to categorical setting and express a correct version of several Badiou’s
statements. We mainly follow the works by Peter Johnstone10 and
Saunders MacLane and Ieke Moerdijk11.
1. From Ontology to Phenomenology
Since at least Kant’s12 Pure Reason, the question of causation has
been pivotal to theoretical philosophy. What are the a priori rules of
deduction that can be assumed without the use of senses? As if re-
quiring no historical insight, Badiou13 assumes that the question of the
’pure’ then best correlates with formal logic and set theory: that ’math-
ematics is ontology—the science of being qua being’—even despite the
dialectic ’impasses of logic’ (eg. Go¨del, Tarski and Cohen).
When it comes to ontology, Badiou claims, an event can only be
localized against this language; there is no other way to for it to de-
ploy its consequences but through those impasses which could not be
communicated without the use of set-theoretic language. In this sense,
even if the event is about what mathematics is not, his reductive un-
derstanding of mathematics becomes crucial to understanding precisely
that what that ’what is not’ is. Expressed in formal language, Badiou
then deploys the event as a self-belonging, auto-affirmative multiple
e ∈ e. It is the crux of his argument that the very existence of such an
’event-multiple’ obstructs the axiom of foundation14.
1.1. Axiom (Foundation). For each non-empty set x there is an ele-
ment y ∈ x so that their intersection x ∩ y = ∅ is empty.
The connection between the event and Cohen’s argument, however,
is rather ’metaphorical’ and there is no mathematically material way to
combine the two insights that occupy Badiou in the beginning and the
end of the Being and Event, that is, the association between the event-
multiple e and the ’generic’ decision or set ♀, which stands out as some-
thing ’supernumerary’ to a particular transitive, denumerable model of
set theory S. By contrast, the Logics of Worlds begins from a different
set of problematics: he seeks to treat the question of ’phenomenology’
instead. One might wonder if the latter work then connects the two
approaches to the ’inconsistent’, real being. Unfortunately, Badiou15
confesses that this is not the case.
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But what precisely happened when Cohen used his insight to intro-
duce the contradicting situations whose synthesis could not be but ’in-
consistent’ in the sense of classical set theory? We answer this question
from the point of view of categorical techniques. They form another
way to localize the consequences of the event. This coheres with the
more topological insight according to which what is crucial to an event
is not the way it is regulated in itself but as it happens to itself in-
stead: the event ’makes the difference: not in space and time, but to
space and time’16. Space and time are Kant’s a priori categories for
the ’trans-phenomenal real’. And if there is an event, it should happen
to them.
This insight obviously lacks in Badiou’s work, not least because the
absence of categorical approach to his ’transitory ontology’ as pointed
out by Norman Madarasz17. The only topoi Badiou then deals with
are so called local topoi : they are local in respect to set-theory and, in
that restricted domain, Badiou is right in that phenomenology could
only arise as a ’calculated phenomenology’.
2. Category Theory—A New Adventure?
The lack of categorical insight, however, does not mean the lack of
categorical references. The categorical revolution is immersed in Ba-
diou’s own approach even if in a dead, unspeaking way. Indeed, by ar-
guing that the formalism of the Logics of Worlds ’is very different from
the one found in the Being and Event as it shifts from ’onto-logy’ to
’onto-logy ’ Badiou refers to category theory18. It deals with a different
formalism, he argues: an alternative approach to the ’trans-phenomenal
real’19. Yet, he argues, in this precise sense category theory makes no
difference; it has no implications to space and time as concepts.
If this only were the case. Instead, Badiou himself refuses to make a
Kantian shift to understand a mathematical object in the categorical
way: not in relation to what it consists of but in the way in which
it relates to other objects instead. He cannot comply with what he
himself regards as Kant’s ’sanctimonious declaration that we can have
no knowledge of this or that’20 as such an inquiry would be ’always
threatening you with detention, the authorization to platonize’21. In
the sense that categorical objects have no contents, they are all empty.
Yet Badiou fails to grasp the contents of incorporeality as it resides
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even between such empty objects, that is, the statement ’x ∈ A’ as an
incorporeal relationship. Categorical topos theory, by contrast, treats
it precisely as such: as an arrow between objects instead of assuming
x and A to exist as corporeal entities like Badiou does.
By contrast, to define22 a category C it consists of a collection of
objects Ob(C ) and a class (possibly not a set in the ZFC axiomatics)
morphisms or arrows Hom(A,B) for any two objects A,B ∈ Ob(C ).
In a topos, the predicate ’∈’ is viewed precisely as such an arrow.
Therefore, objects are contained by a category but objects themselves
own no elements. They have other ways to individuate: the class of
relationships specified by Hom.
A category, not an object, is thus the corporeal entity for mathe-
matics to incorporate. Much of Badiou’s argument by contrast focuses
still on what objects, not their category, do incorporate. But in the
’modern mathematical corpus’23, which Badiou is unable to master,
categorical thinking then shifts from functionality to functoriality : a
(covariant) functor between categories F : C1 → C2 is a suitable set of
maps F : Ob(C1)→ Ob(C2) and F : Hom(A,B)→ Hom(F (A), F (B)).
Not only does it transform objects to others but also the relationships
between them in a ’diagrammatically’ compatible way. It is another
shortcoming in Badiou’s work that he cannot distinguish between ’func-
tions’ and ’functors’ and, ultimately, understand the role of diagram-
matic argumentation.
Against this background, concepts like topology and sets can only
be introduced afterwards, not as a priori entities but as they instead
individuate from the class of objects and relationships—and functors
between them. This means to say that they will be defined functorially.
For example, a point in topos theory is a pair of functors S ets → E .
These two are categories of specific kind which are called elementary
topoi. By contrast, Badiou himself treats topoi only as if they were
themselves sets (as Ob(E ) instead of E ). The functorial idea that
not only objects but also relationships do transform in a functorially
meaningful way is ignored.
These are the basic hypothesis of my paper. Let us now demonstrate
them in a mathematically adequate way.
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3. Badiou’s Ontological Reduction
The technical part of the argument now begins by introducing the
local formalism that constitutes the basis of Badiou’s own, ’calculated
phenomenology’. Badiou is unwilling to give up his thesis that the
history of thinking of being (ontology) is the history of mathematics
and, as he reads it, that of set theory. It is then no accident that
set theory is the regulatory framework under which topos theory is
being expressed. He does not refer to topoi explicitly but rather to
the so called complete Heyting algebras which are their procedural
equivalents. However, he fails to mention that there are both ’internal’
and ’external’ Heyting algebras, the latter group of which refers to
local topos theory, while it appears that he only discusses the latter—a
reduction that guarantees that indeed that the categorical insight may
give nothing new.
Indeed, the external complete Heyting algebras T then form a cate-
gory of the so called T -sets24, which are the basic objects in the ’world’
of the Logics of Worlds. They local topoi or the so called ’locales’ that
are also ’sets’ in the traditional sense of set theory. This ’constitution’
of his worlds thus relies only upon Badiou’s own decision to work on
this particular regime of objects, even if that regime then becomes piv-
otal to his argument which seeks to denounce the relevance of category
theory.
This problematic is particularly visible in the designation of the world
m (mathematically a topos) as a ’complete’ (presentative) situation of
being of ’universe [which is] the (empty) concept of a being of the
Whole’25. He recognises the ’impostrous’ nature of such a ’whole’ in
terms of Russell’s paradox, but in actual mathematical practice the
’whole’ m becomes to signify the category of S ets26—or any similar
topos that localizable in terms of set theory. The vocabulary is some-
what confusing, however, because sometimes T is called the ’transcen-
dental of the world’, as if m were defined only as a particular locale,
while elsewhere m refers to the category of all locales (L oc).
3.1. Definition. An external Heyting algebra is a set T with a partial
order relation <, a minimal element µ ∈ T , a maximal element M ∈ T .
It further has a ’conjunction’ operator ∧ : T ×T → T so that p∧ q ≤ p
and p ∧ q = q ∧ p. Furthermore, there is a proposition entailing the
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equivalence p ≤ q if and only if p ∧ q = p. Furthermore p∧M = p and
µ ∧ p = µ for any p ∈ T .
3.2. Remark. In the ’diagrammatic’ language that pertains to categori-
cal topoi, by contrast, the minimal and maximal elements of the lattice
Ω can only be presented as diagrams, not as sets. The internal or-
der relation ≤Ω can then be defined as the so called equaliser of the
conjunction ∧ and projection-map
≤Ω
e
// Ω× Ω
∧
//
pi1
// L.
The symmetry can be expressed diagrammatically by saying that
≤Ω ∩ ≥Ω
  //
_

s
∆◦ι
&&▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲
≤Ω _
e

≥Ω
  // Ω× Ω
is a pull-back and commutes. The minimal and maximal elements,
in categorical language, refer to the elements evoked by the so called
initial and terminal objects 0 and 1.
In the case of local Grothendieck-topoi—Grothendieck-topoi that sup-
port generators—the external Heyting algebra T emerges as a push-
forward of the internal algebra Ω, the logic of the external algebra
T := γ∗(Ω) is an analogous push-forward of the internal logic of Ω but
this is not the case in general.
What Badiou further requires of this ’transcendental algebra’ T is
that it is complete as a Heyting algebra.
3.3. Definition. A complete external Heyting algebra T is an external
Heyting algebra together with a function Σ : PT → T (the least upper
boundary) which is distributive with respect to ∧. Formally this means
that ΣA ∧ b = Σ{a ∧ b | a ∈ A}.
3.4. Remark. In terms of the subobject classifier Ω, the envelope can be
defined as the map Ωt : ΩΩ → Ω1 ∼= Ω, which is internally left adjoint
to the map ↓ seg : Ω→ ΩΩ that takes p ∈ Ω to the characteristic map
of ↓ (p) = {q ∈ Ω | q ≤ p}27.
The importance the external complete Heyting algebra plays in the
intuitionist logic relates to the fact that one may now define precisely
such an intuitionist logic on the basis of the operations defined above.
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3.5. Definition (Deduction). The dependence relation ⇒ is an opera-
tor satisfying
p⇒ q = Σ{t | p ∩ t ≤ q}.
3.6. Definition (Negation). A negation ¬ : T → T is a function so
that
¬p = Σ{q | p ∩ q = µ},
and it then satisfies p ∧ ¬p = µ.
Unlike in what Badiou28 calls a ’classical world’ (usually called a
Boolean topos, where ¬¬ = 1Ω), the negation ¬ does not have to be
reversible in general. In the domain of local topoi, this is only the case
when the so called internal axiom of choice29 is valid, that is, when
epimorphisms split—for example in the case of set theory. However,
one always has p ≤ ¬¬p. On the other hand, all Grothendieck-topoi—
topoi still materially presentable over S ets—are possible to represent
as parts of a Boolean topos.
4. Atomic Objects
Badiou criticises the proper form of intuition associated with mul-
tiplicities such as space and time. However, his own ’intuitions’ are
constrained by set theory. His intuition is therefore as ’transitory’ as
is the ontology in terms of which it is expressed. Following this con-
strained line of reasoning, however, let me now discuss how Badiou
encounters the question of ’atoms’ and materiality: in terms of the so
called ’atomic’ T -sets.
If topos theory designates the subobject-classifier Ω relationally, the
external, set-theoretic T -form reduces the classificatory question again
into the incorporeal framework. There is a set-theoretical, explicit
order-structure (T,<) contra the more abstract relation 1 → Ω per-
tinent to categorical topos theory. Atoms then appear in terms of
this operator <: the ’transcendental grading’ that provides the ’unity
through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a
concept of the object’30.
Formally, in terms of an external Heyting algebra this comes down
to an entity (A, Id) where A is a set and Id : A → T is a function
satisfying specific conditions.
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4.1. Definition (Equaliser). First, there is an ’equaliser’ to which Ba-
diou refers as the ’identity’ Id : A× A→ T satisfies two conditions:
1) symmetry: Id(x, y) = Id(y, x) and
2) transitivity: Id(x, y) ∧ Id(y, z) ≤ Id(x, z).
They guarantee that the resulting ’quasi-object’ is objective in the sense
of being distinguished from the gaze of the ’subject’: ’the differences
in degree of appearance are not prescribed by the exteriority of the
gaze’31.
This analogous ’identity’-function actually relates to the structural
equalization-procedure as appears in category theory. Identities can
be structurally understood as equivalence-relations. Given two arrows
X ⇒ Y , an equaliser (which always exists in a topos, given the exis-
tence of the subobject classifier Ω) is an object Z → X such that both
induced maps Z → Y are the same. Given a topos-theoretic object X
and U , pairs of elements of X over U can be compared or ’equivalized’
by a morphism XU ×XU
eq
// ΩU sturcturally ’internalising’ the syn-
thetic notion of ’equality’ between two U -elements.32 Now it is possible
to formulate the cumbersome notion of the ’atom of appearing’.
4.2. Definition. An atom is a function a : A → T defined on a T -set
(A, Id) so that
(A1) a(x) ∧ Id(x, y) ≤ a(y) and
(A2) a(x) ∧ a(y) ≤ Id(x, y).
As expressed in Badiou’s own vocabulary, an atom can be defined
as an ’object-component which, intuitively, has at most one element in
the following sense: if there is an element of A about which it can be
said that it belongs absolutely to the component, then there is only one.
This means that every other element that belongs to the component
absolutely is identical, within appearing, to the first ’33.
These two properties in the definition of an atom is highly motivated
by the theory of T -sets (or Ω-sets in the standard terminology of topo-
logical logic). A map A → T satisfying the first inequality is usually
thought as a ’subobject’ of A, or formally a T -subset of A. The idea is
that, given a T -subset B ⊂ A, we can consider the function
IdB(x) := a(x) = Σ{Id(x, y) | y ∈ B}
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and it is easy to verify that the first condition is satisfied. In the
opposite direction, for a map a satisfying the first condition, the subset
B = {x | a(x) = Ex := Id(x, x)}
is clearly a T -subset of A.
The second condition states that the subobject a : A → T is a
singleton. This concept stems from the topos-theoretic internalization
of the singleton-function {·} : a 7→ {a} which determines a particular
class of T -subsets of A that correspond to the atomic T -subsets. For
example, in the case of an ordinary set S and an element s ∈ S the
singleton {s} ⊂ S is a particular, atomic type of subset of S.
The question of ’elements’ incorporated by an object can thus be
expressed externally in Badiou’s local theory but ’internally’ in any
elementary topos. For the same reason, there are two ways for an
element to be ’atomic’: in the first sense an ’element depends solely on
the pure (mathematical) thinking of the multiple’, whereas the second
sense relates it ’to its transcendental indexing’34. In topos theory, the
distinction is slightly more cumbersome35.
Badiou still requires a further definition in order to state the ’postu-
late of materialism’.
4.3.Definition. An atom a : A→ T is real if if there exists an element
x ∈ T so that a(y) = Id(x, y) for all y ∈ A.
This definition gives rise to the postulate inherent to Badiou’s un-
derstanding of ’democratic materialism’.
4.4. Postulate (Postulate of Materialism). In a T -set (A, Id), every
atom of appearance is real.
What the postulate designates is that there really needs to exist
s ∈ A for every suitable subset that structurally (read categorically)
appears to serve same relations as the singleton {s}. In other words,
what ’appears’ materially, according to the postulate, has to ’be’ in the
set-theoretic, incorporeal sense of ’ontology’. Topos theoretically this
formulation relates to the so called axiom of support generators (SG),
which states that the terminal object 1 of the underlying topos is a
generator. This means that the so called global elements, elements of
the form 1 → X , are enough to determine any particular object X .
Thus, it is this specific condition (support generators) that is assumed
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by Badiou’s notion of the ’unity’ or ’constitution’ of ’objects’. In par-
ticular this makes him cross the line—the one that Kant drew when
he asked Quid juris? or ’Haven’t you crossed the limit?’ as Badiou36
translates.
But even without assuming the postulate itself, that is, when consid-
ering a weaker category of T -sets not required to fulfill the postulate of
atomism, the category of quasi-T -sets has a functor taking any quasi-T -
set A into the corresponding quasi-T -set of singletons SA by x 7→ {x},
where SA ⊂ PA and PA is the quasi-T -set of all quasi-T -subsets, that
is, all maps T → A satisfying the first one of the two conditions of an
atom designated by Badiou. It can then be shown that, in fact, SA
itself is a sheaf whose all atoms are ’real’ and which then is a proper
T -set satisfying the ’postulate of materialism’. In fact, the category of
T -S ets is equivalent to the category of T -sheaves S hvs(T, J)37. In the
language of T -sets, the ’postulate of materialism’ thus comes down to
designating an equality between A and its completed set of singletons
SA. We demonstrate this in the next section.
The particular objects Badiou discusses can now be defined as such
quasi-T -sets whose all atoms are real; they give rise to what Badiou
phrases as the ’ontological category par excellence’38.
4.5. Definition. An object in the category of T -S ets is a pair (A, Id)
satisfying the above conditions so that every atom a : A→ T is real.
Next, though not specifying this in the original text, Badiou attempts
to show that such ’objects’ indeed give rise to a mathematical category
of T -S ets .
5. Badiou’s ’Subtle Scholium’: T -sets are ’Sheaves’
By following established accounts39 Badiou attempts to demonstrate
that T -sets defined over an external complete Heyting algebra give
rise to a so called Grothendieck-topos—a topos of sheaves of sets over
a category. As T is a set, it can be made a required category by
deciding its elements to be its objects and the order relations between
its elements the morphisms. He introduces the following notation.
5.1. Definition. The self-identity or existence in a T -set (A, Id) is
Ex = Id(x, x).
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5.2. Proposition. From the symmetry and transitivity of Id it follows
that40
Id(x, y) ≤ Ex ∧ Ey.
5.3. Theorem. An object (A, Id) whose every atom is real, is a sheaf.
The demonstration that every object (A, Id) is indeed a sheaf re-
quires the definition of three operators: compatibility, order and local-
isation.
5.4. Definition (Localisation). For an atom a : A→ T , a localisation
a I p on p ∈ T is the atom which for each y establishes
(a I p)(y) = a(y) ∧ p.
The fact that the resulting a I p : A → T is an atom follows trivially
from the fact that (the pull-back operator) ∧ is compatible with the
order-relation. Because of the ’postulate of materialism’, this localised
atom itself is represented by some element xp ∈ A. Therefore, the
localization x I p also makes sense: Id(x I p, y) = Id(x, y) ∧ p.
Two functions f and g may are compatible if they agree for every
element of their common domain f(x) = g(x). But when one only
defines f and g as morphisms on objects (say X and Y ) there needs to
be a concept for determining the localisations f |X∧Y = g|X∧Y .
5.5.Definition (Compatibility). In Badiou’s formalism, two atoms are
compatible if
a ‡ b ⇐⇒ a I Eb = b I Ea.
5.6. Proposition. I already declared that Id(a, b) ≤ Ea ∧ Eb; it is
an easy consequence of the compatibility condition that if a ‡ b, then
Ea∧Eb ≤ Id(a, b) and thus an equality between the two. This equality
can be taken as a definition of compatibility.
Sketch. The other implication entailed by the proposed, alternative def-
inition has a bit lengthier proof. As a sketch, it needs first to be shown
that a I Id(a, b) = b I Id(a, b), and that the localization is transitive
in the sense that (a I p) I q = a I (p ∧ q)41, that is, it is compati-
ble with the order structure. Such compatibility is obviously required
in general sheaf theory, but unlike in the restricted case of locales,
Grothendieck-topoi relativise (by the notion of a sieve) the substan-
tive assumption of the order-relation. Only in the case of locales such
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hierarchical sieve-structures not only appear as local, synthetic effects
but are predetermined globally—ontologically by the poset-structure
T . Finally, once demonstrated that a I (Ea ∧ Eb) = a I Eb, the fact
that a ‡ b is an easy consequence42. 
5.7. Definition (Order-Relation). Formally one denotes a ≤ b if and
only if Ea = Id(a, b). This relation occurs now on the level of the object
A instead of the Heyting algebra T . It is again an easy demonstration
that a ≤ b is equivalent to the condition that both a ‡ b and Ea ≤ Eb.
Furthermore, it is rather straightforward to show that the relation ≤
is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric43.
Proof of the Theorem 5.3. The proof of the sheaf-condition is now based
on the equivalence of the following three conditions:
a = b I Ea ⇐⇒
a ‡ b and Ea ≤ Eb ⇐⇒
Ea = Id(a, b).
These may be established by showing that Ea = Id(a, b), if and only
if a = b I Ea. The sufficiency of the latter condition amounts to first
showing that E(a I p) = Ea ∧ p44.
To proceed with the proof, we need to connect the previous relations
to the envelope Σ. First, it needs to be shown that if b ‡ b′, then
b(x) ∧ b′(y) ≤ Id(x, y)
for all x, y. This follows easily from the previous discussion. The crucial
part is now to show that the function
π(x) = Σ{Id(b, x) | b ∈ B}
is an atom if the elements of B are compatible in pairs45. This is
because it then retains a ’real’ element which materialises such an atom.
The first axiom (A1)
Id(x, y) ∧ π(x) ≤ π(y)
is straightforward46. Now π(x) ∧ π(y) = Σ{Id(b, x) ∧ Id(b′, y)} and
by the previous Id(b, x) ∧ Id(b′, y) ≤ Id(x, y) so Id(x, y) is an upper
boundary, but since the previous Σ is the least upper bound, we have
π(x) ∧ π(y) ≤ Id(x, y). Therefore π is an atom and can denote by ǫ
the the corresponding real element. Then it is possible to demonstrate
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that Eǫ = Σ{Eb | b ∈ B}. It follows that ǫ itself is actually the least
upper bound of B: there exists a real synthesis of B47.
Badiou characterises this ’transcendental functor of the object’48,
in other words this sheaf, as ’not exactly a function’ as it associates
rather than elements, ’subsets’. A sheaf can thus be expressed as a
strata in which each neighborhood (transcendental degree) U becomes
associated with the set of sections defined over U , usually denoted by
F(U). Therefore, a sheaf is actually a functor C op → S ets, where C
is a category. In Badiou’s restricted case C is determined to be the
particular kind of category CT
49 deriving directly from the poset T . It
results with a functor CT
op → S ets in the following manner. Formally,
for an object A, define FA(p) = {x | x ∈ A and Ex = p}. If there
is any y ∈ FA(p) with Ey = p, then the equation E(y I q) = Ey ∧ q
amounts to E(y I q) = p ∧ q. If q ≤ p then Ey I q = q giving rise to a
commutative diagram:
p
FA
//
≤

FA(p)
· I q

q
FA
// FA(q)
which guarantees FA to be a functor and thus a presheaf.
Finally, one needs to demonstrate the sheaf-condition, the ’real syn-
thesis’ in Badiou’s terminology. The functor J(p) = {Θ | ΣΘ = p}
forms a ’basis’ of a so called Grothendieck-topology on T (see the next
section). Let me now consider such a basis Θ and a collection xq of ele-
ments where q ∈ Θ ∈ J(p). it derives from an imaginary section xp, the
elements would be pairwise compatible. In such a case, let me assume
that they satisfy the ’matching’ condition xq I (q ∧ q
′) = xq′ I (q ∧ q
′),
which implies that xq ‡ xq′ . One would thus like to find an element xp,
where xq = xp I q for all q ∈ Θ. But to demonstrate that the elements
xq commute in the diagram, they need to be shown to be pairwise com-
patible. One thus chooses xp to be the envelope Σ{xq | q ∈ Θ} and it
clearly satisfies the condition. Namely, we just demonstrated that the
envelope Σ{xq} localises to xq for all q, that is,
Σ{xq} I q = xq, ∀q,
and that EΣ{xq} = p. The fact that it is unique then will do the trick.
In the vocabulary of the next section, we have thus sketched Badiou’s
16
proof that objects are those of the topos S hvs(T, J) (see the following
remark). 
As a result, Badiou nearly succeeds in establishing the first part of
his perverted project to show that T -sets form a topos (while claiming
to work on topos theory more broadly). In other words, T -sets are
’capable of lending consistency to the multiple’ and express sheaf as a
set ’in the space of its appearing’50.
5.8. Remark. As a final remark, what Badiou disregards in respect to
the definition of an object, given a region B ⊂ A, whose elements
are compatible in pairs, he demonstrates that the function π(x) =
Σ{Id(b, x) | b ∈ B} is an atom of A. If one wants to consider the
smallest B¯ containing B within A which itself is an object, the ’real’
element representing π(x) should by the postulate of materialism itself
lie in the atom: ǫ ∈ B¯ and thus because all elements are compatible,
every element b′ ∈ B¯ has b′ ≤ b. Therefore, the sub-objects of the ob-
ject A are generated by the ideals ↓ (ǫ), each of them purely determined
by the arrow 1→ {ǫ} → B¯. (See remark 6.8.)
6. Categorical and Changing Forms of ’Materiality’
As discussed in the previous section, category theory stands for the
broader tendency in which mathematics moves away from the questions
of contents and consistence of being towards those related to one’s com-
position, coherence and being-there: the question of ’taking place’ in
a topos. Topos is a Greek phrase that refers to a ‘place’ or a ‘com-
monplace’, indeed, and it quite interestingly relates phenomenological
concepts like ’taking place’ and ’being-there’ to mathematics. Thid
has to do with Kant’s reasoning but also the long discussion that fol-
lowed. It particularly contests Badiou’s own ’Platonic’ position on the
so called ’calculated phenomenology’, whose formal foundations (the
theory of external complete Heyting algebras) was expressed above.
Instead of denouncing the question of being, however, we would
rather say that topos theory makes the two discourses intersect : the
ontological one of being and the phenomenological one of being-there.
Sheaf theory was the first implication of this encounter, and it is cru-
cial to understand sheaf theory both to understand Badiou’s own aims
but also to introduce the definition of Grothendieck-topoi which also
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inspired the broader definition of elementary topoi. A sheaf in particu-
lar is a functor which composes different sections so as to categorically
’represent’ the idea of a function without referring to it on the level of
set-theoretic elements.
6.1. Definition. If X is a topological space, then for each open set
U the sheaf F consists of an object F(U) ∈ Ob(C ) satisfying two
conditions. First, there needs to exist certain ’natural’ inclusions, so
called restrictions
F(U)→ F(U ′) : fU 7→ fU |U ′
for all open sets U ′ ⊂ U . There is also a compatibility condition which
states that given a collection fi ∈ F(Ui), there needs to be f ∈ F(
⋃
i Ui)
so that f |Ui = fi for all i. In the categorical language, the sheaf-
condition means that the diagram
F(U)→
∏
i
F(Ui)⇒
∏
i,j
F(Ui ×U Uj)
is a coequaliser for each covering sieve (Ui) of U , usually determined
as the set J(U) of such sieves.
6.2. Remark (Representable sheaves). Inspired by sheaf theory, we need
to consider them as the so called ’natural transformations’ (see 6.2,
p. 18). Such transformations are dealt with by the so called Yoneda
Lemma that is the starting point of any intelligible application of cat-
egory theory.
Indeed, based on Yoneda lemma, the transformation from ’classical
spaces’ to sheaves is natural in the sense that given any ’classical space’
denoted as an object A, the natural transformations C
hA
))
F
55
✤✤ ✤✤
 C
between the functors hA and F corresponds to the elements of F(A).
If ’spaces’ are regarded themselves equated with their corresponding
(pre)sheaves hA, we then have F (A) = Hom(A, F ). This gives as the
famous Yoneda embedding
y : C → S etsC
op
,
which embeds the index-category C into its corresponding Grothendieck-
topos S etsC
op
. It maps objects of C into representable sheaves in
S etsC
op
.
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6.3. Remark. The above definition is based on the Bourbakian, set-
theoretic definition of topology as a collection of open subsets (X)
(which is a locale). It gives rise to a similar structure Badiou defines
as the ’transcendental functor’, that is, a sheaf identified with the set-
theoretically explicated functional strata. Topos theory makes an al-
ternative, categorical definition of topology—for example the so called
Grothendieck-topology. Regardless of the topological framework, the
idea is to categorically impose such structures of localization on S ets
that enforce ’points’, and thus the ’space’ consisting of such points,
to emerge. Whereas set theory presumes the initially atomic primacy
of points, the sheaf-description of space does not assume the result
of such localization—the actual points—as analytically given but only
synthetic result of the functorial procedure of localisation. However,
inasmuch as sheaf-theory—and topos theory—aims to bridge the cat-
egorical register with the ’ontological’ sphere of sets, such a strata of
sets is still involved even in the case of topos theory. For a more general
class of such categorical stratifications, one may move to the theory of
grupoids and stacks, that is, categories fibred on grupoids.
6.4. Definition (Grothendieck-topology). Let C be a category. A
sieve—in French a ’crible’—on C is a covering family of C so that
it is downwards closed. A Grothendieck-topology on a category C is a
function J assigning a collection J(C) of sieves for every C ∈ C such
that
1) the maximal sieve {f | any f : D → C} ∈ J(C ),
2) (stability) if S ∈ J(C) then h∗(S) ∈ J(D) for any h : D → C,
and
3) (transitivity) if S ∈ J(C) and R is any sieve on C such that
h∗(R) ∈ J(D) for all arrows h : D → C, then R ∈ J(C).
The stability condition specifies that the intersections of two sieves
is also a sieve. Given the latter two conditions, a topology itself is a
sheaf on the maximal topology consisting of all sieves. It is often useful
to consider a basis; for example Badiou works on such a ’basis’ in the
previous proof without explicitly stating this.
6.5. Definition. A basis K of a Grothendieck-topology J consists of
collections (not necessarily sieves) of arrows:
1) for any isomorphism f : C ′ → C, f ∈ K(C),
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2) if {fi : Ci → C | i ∈ I} ∈ K(C), then the pull-backs along any
arrow g : D → C are contained in {π2 : Ci×C D → D | i ∈ I} ∈
K(D), and
3) if {fi : Ci → C | i ∈ I} ∈ K(C), and if for each i ∈ I there is
a family {gij : Dij → Ci | j ∈ Ii} ∈ K(Ci), also the family of
composites {fi ◦ gij : Dij → C | i ∈ I, j ∈ Ii} lies in K(C).
For such a basis K one may define a sieve JK(C) = {S | S ⊃ R ∈
K(C)} that generates a topology.
6.6. Remark. The notion of Grothendieck-topology enables one to gen-
eralise the notion of a sheaf to a broader class of categories instead of
the (classical) category of Kuratowski-spaces. If esp is the category
of topological spaces and continuous maps, sheaves on X ∈ Ob(C )
are actually equivalent to the full subcategory of esp/(X,C ) of lo-
cal homeomorphism p : E → X . The corresponding pair of adjoint
functors S etsC
op
⇄ esp/(X,C ) yields an associated sheaf functor
S etsC
op
→ S hvs(X) which shows that sheaves can be regarded ei-
ther as presheaves with exactness condition or as spaces with local
homeomorphisms into X51.
6.7. Remark. In the case of Grothendieck-topology, there is an equiv-
alence of categories between the category of pre-sheaves S etsC
op
and
the category of sheaves S hvs(C , J) where J is the so called canonical
Grothendieck-topology. Thus one often omits the reference to partic-
ular topology and deals with presheaves S etsC
op
instead, even if their
objects do not satisfying the two sheaf-conditions.
6.8. Remark. Now we have introduced the formalism required to accom-
plish the final step of Badiou’s proof in the previous section (see re-
mark 5.8). Namely, the category S etsT
op
is generated by representable
presheaves of the form y(p) : q 7→ HomT (q, p) by the Yoneda lemma.
Let
a : S etsT
op
→ S hvs(T, J)
be the associated sheaf-functor P 7→ P++52. Then because T is a
poset, for any p ∈ T , the map Hom(·, p) → 1 is a mono, and because
a is left-exact, also ay(p) → 1 is a mono53. Through it, any sheaf
is a subobject of 1. This is exactly the axiom of support generators
(SG) that is crucial to Badiou’s constitutive postulate of materialism:
it follows exactly from the organization of T as an ordered poset and
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this order-relation being functorially extendible to general objects of
S hvs(T, J).
7. Historical Insight: From Categories to Geometry
But what makes categories historically remarkable and, in particular,
what demonstrates that the categorical change is genuine? Of course,
as we have done, it is one thing to discuss and demonstrate how Badiou
fails to show that category theory is not genuine. But it is another thing
to say that mathematics itself does change, and that the ’Platonic’ a
priori in Badiou’s endeavour is insufficient. For this we need something
more tangible, something more empirical.
Yet the empirical does not need to stand only in a way opposed
to mathematics. Rather, it relates to results that stemmed from and
would have been impossible to comprehend without the use of cate-
gories. It is only through experience that we are taught the meaning
and use of categories. An experience obviously absent from Badiou’s
habituation in mathematics.
To contrast, Grothendieck opened up a new regime of algebraic ge-
ometry by generalising the notion of a space first scheme-theoretically
(with sheaves) and then in terms of grupoids and higher categories54.
Topos theory became synonymous to the study of categories that would
satisfy the so called Giraud’s axioms55 based on Grothendieck’s geomet-
ric machinery (though only a limited part of it). By utilising such tools,
Pierre Deligne was able to prove the so called Weil conjectures, mod-p
analogues of the famous Riemann hypothesis.
These conjectures—anticipated already by Gauss—concern the so
called local ζ-functions that derive from counting the number of points
of an algebraic variety over a finite field, an algebraic structure similar
to that of for example rational Q or real numbers R but with only a
finite number of elements. By representing algebraic varieties in poly-
nomial terms, it is possible to analyse geometric structures analogous
to Riemann hypothesis but over finite fields Z/pZ (the whole numbers
modulo p). Such ’discrete’ varieties had previously been excluded from
topological and geometric inquiry, while it now occurred that geometry
was no longer overshadowed by a need to decide between ’discrete’ and
’continuous’ modalities of the subject (that Badiou still separates).
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Along with the continuous ones, also discrete variates could then
be studied based on Betti numbers, and similarly as what Cohen’s ar-
gument made manifest in set-theory, there seemed to occur ’deeper’,
topological precursors that had remained invisible under the classi-
cal formalism. In particular, the so called e´tale-cohomology allowed
topological concepts (e.g., neighbourhood) to be studied in the con-
text of algebraic geometry whose classical, Zariski-description was too
rigid to allow a meaningful interpretation. Introducing such concepts
on the basis of Jean-Pierre Serre’s suggestion, Alexander Grothendieck
did revolutionarize the field of geometry, and Pierre Deligne’s proof
of the Weil-conjenctures, not to mention Wiles’ work on Fermat’s last
theorem that subsequentely followed.
Grothendieck’s crucial insight drew on his observation that if mor-
phisms of varieties were considered by their ’adjoint’ field of functions,
it was possible to consider geometric morphisms as equivalent to alge-
braic ones. The algebraic category was restrictive, however, because
field-morphisms are always monomorphisms which makes geometric
morphisms epis: to generalize the notion of a neighbourhood to al-
gebraic category he needed to embed algebraic fields into a larger cate-
gory of rings. While a traditional Kuratowski covering space is locally
’split’—as mathematicians call it—the same was not true for the dual
category of fields. In other words, the category of fields did not have
an operator analogous to pull-backs (fibre products) unless considered
as being embedded within rings fro which pull-backs have a co-dual ex-
pressed by the tensor operator ⊗. Grothendieck thus realized he could
replace ’incorporeal’ or contained neighborhoods U →֒ X by a more
relational description: as maps U → X that are not necessarily monic,
but which correspond to ring-morphisms instead.
Topos theory applies similar insight but not in the context of only
specific varieties but for the entire theory of sets instead. Ultimately,
Lawvere and Tierney realized the importance of these ideas to the
concept of classification and truth in general. Classification of elements
between two sets comes down to a question: does this element belong
to a given set or not? In category of S ets this question calls for a
binary answer: true or false. But not in a general topos in which the
composition of the subobject-classifier is more geometric.
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Indeed, Lawvere and Tierney then considered this characteristc map
’either/or’ as a categorical relationship instead without referring to its
’contents’. It was the structural form of this morphism (which they
called ’true’) and as contrasted with other relationships that marked the
beginning of geometric logic. They thus rephrased the binary complete
Heyting algebra of classical truth with the categorical version Ω defined
as an object, which satisfies a specific pull-back condition. The crux of
topos theory was then the so called Freyd–Mitchell embedding theorem
which effectively guaranteed the explicit set of elementary axioms so
as to formalize topos theory.
We will come back to this definition later. But to understand its
significance as a link between geometry and language, it is useful to
see how the characteristic map (either/or) behaves in set theory. In
particular, by expressing truth in this way, it became possible to re-
duce Axiom of Comprehension56, which states that any suitable formal
condition λ gives rise to a peculiar set {x ∈ λ}, to a rather elementary
statement regarding adjoint functors57.
At the same time, many mathematical structures became express-
ible not only as general topoi but in terms of a more specific class of
Grothendieck-topoi. There, too, the ’way of doing mathematics’ is dif-
ferent in the sense that the object-classifier is categorically defined and
there is no empty set (initial object) but mathematics starts from the
terminal object 1 instead. However, there is a material way to express
the ’difference’ such topoi make in terms of set theory: for every such a
topos there is a sheaf-form enabling it to be expressed as a category of
sheaves S etsC for a category C with a specific Grothendieck-topology.
8. Postulate of Materialism—Or Two Postulates
Instead?
Let me now discuss the postulate of materialism from the categori-
cal point of view to see how and why geometry matters to the question
of materiality, and even in relation to set theory. Badiou’s own defin-
tion is a strong or constrained one and we will explicate the condition
which enables us to specify whether a ’weakly material’ topos is actu-
ally local, that is, constitutively material in Badiou’s strong sense of
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the term. Therefore, we begin with a more general, abstract expres-
sion of Badiou’s objects (in terms of elementary theory) even if they
do satisfy also the more specific conditions (local theory).
Indeed, Badiou’s objects may always be interpreted as Grothendieck-
topoi (situated in S etsT
op
) which is a 2-category distinct from the more
abstractly designated 2-category elementary topoi (T op). An elemen-
tary topos E is a Grothendieck-topos only if there is a particular mor-
phism E → S ets that ’materialises’ its internal experience of truth
even if this morphism wasn’t ’bounded’ in the sense that the internal
logic of the topos E isn’t reducible to the external logic of T -S ets (or
S ets).
8.1. Postulate (Weak Postulate of Materialism). Categorically the
weaker version of the postulate of materialism signifies precisely condi-
tion which makes an elementary topos a so called Grothendieck-topos
(see remark 10.3). In particular, it is a topos E with a specific materi-
alization morphism E → S ets .
Let us now discuss how this weak postulate of materialism relates to
what Badiou takes as the ’postulate of materialism’. A Groethendick-
topos can generally be written as S etsC
op
defined over any category C
in which points might have internal automorphisms for example. This
means that the ’sections’ do materialise in the category of S ets but
its internal structure is still irreducible to this material, set-theoretic
surface of appearance. In Badiou’s case it is this this internal structure
which is not only material but bounded in its very materiality. In effect,
if the underlying ’index-category’ C = CT a poset corresponding to the
external Heyting algebra T , any internal ’torsion’ such as non-trivial
endomorphisms of C are extensively forced out.
What is crucial to Badiou’s demonstration is that objects are atomic—
that every atom is ’real’. That is what we phrase as the postulate of
atomism and in elementary topos theory it is often phrased as the
axiom regarding the support of generators (SG). Let us overview its
categorical meaning. It accounts for the unity and singularity of the
terminal object 1. In general, an object may be said to retain ’global
elements’ 1→ X , but there are also ’local elements’ U → X that might
not be determinable by global elements alone. For each arrow U → X ,
a ’local’ element on U , the pull-back object U∗X in the local topos E /U
has exactly one global element of U∗X , that is, a local element of X
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over U58. The object X , as a whole, cannot be determined by ’global
elements’ alone, if there occurs torsion that obstructs such a dominant
hierarchy pertinent to the category of T -S ets—a poset-structure anal-
ogous to Cohen’s forcing-structure and that Badiou associated with
his ’fundamental law of the subject ’59. Only if such a hierarchy is given
once and for all, does geometric intuition become superfluous. But for
example in the case of the Mo¨bius strip, that is, the non-trivial Z/2Z-
bundles give rise to a category which cannot be similarly forced into a
hierarchical one.
On the basis of the extent to which elements in a X are discerned
by its global elements, one can now phrase the postulate of atomism in
the categorical framework. Of course, unless working in local theory,
this does not yet result with the complete ’postulate of materialism’
in Badiou’s sense. Rather, we need to combine that with the weak
postulate of materialism.
8.2. Axiom (Postulate of Atomism). An elementary topos E supports
generators (SG) if the subobjects of 1 in the topos E generate E . This
means that given any pair of arrows f 6= g : X ⇒ Y , there is U →֒ X
such that the two induced maps U ⇒ Y do not agree. In the case of
E being defined over the topos of S ets , the axiom (SG) is equivalent
to the condition, that the object 1 alone generates the topos E 60. If
E satisfies (SG), then Ω is a cogenerator of E—differenciating between
a parallel pair from the right—and for any topology j or an internal
poset P, both E P and S hvsj(E ) satisfy (SG)
61.
Based on the two postulates—the weak postulate of materialism and
the postulate of atomism—it is now possible to draw the general and ab-
stract topos-theoretic conditions of Badiou’s ’postulate of materialism’
which should rather be phrased as the postulate of atomic materialism.
8.3. Postulate (Strong Postulate of Materialism). In addition to the
weak postulate of materialism, the strong postulate of materialism pre-
sumes that a Grothendieck-topos defined over S ets should additionally
satisfy the postulate of atomism, that is, that its objects are generated
by the subobjects of the terminal object 1. This is the postulate of
atomic materialism.
According to the following proposition, the topoi satisfying the strong
postulate are shown to be local topoi (over S ets) and vice versa. Namely,
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for any such topos one chooses the transcendental T = γ∗(Ω) for its
morphism of materialist appearance γ, and the equivalence then fol-
lows.
8.4. Proposition. If an elementary topos E is Grothendieck-topos de-
fined over γ : E → S ets, then it supports generators if and only if
γ : E → S ets is logical and thus bounded. This means that the inter-
nal complete Heyting algebra Ω transforms into an external complete
Heyting algebra γ∗(Ω) and then E is equivalent to the topos S ets
γ∗(Ω)op .
8.5. Remark. In general topos theory, the subobjects (monics) of the in-
ternal subobject-classifier Ω form a class of arrows Hom(Ω,Ω) as much
as the global elements of Ω, that is, the arrows 1→ Ω, corresponds to
the subobjects of 1. For any object U there are also the subobjects U∗Ω
corresponding to arrows U → Ω, so called generalised points whereas
the localic theory of T -sets fails to resonate with such generalisation.
Therefore, the designation of T as a set of global points is possible only
for Grothendieck-topoi that support generators.
8.6. Remark. Obviously, if one works on an elementary topos E which
is not defined over S ets (contrary to the case of Grothendieck-topoi),
nothing guarantees that the axiom SG would imply the topos to be a
locale. The implication is valid only when E is a Grothendieck-topos
in the first place. The axiom SG could thus be taken as an alternative
but incomplete version of the ’postulate of materialism’, whereas the
Grothendieck-condition together makes it strong or constitutive in Ba-
diou’s sense. But because SG alone does not guarantee the existence
of the materialization morphism γ : E → S ets , we can say that the
strong postulate of materialism is SG when the weak condition already
applies. In other words, it makes sense to treat the two versions of the
postulate in a hierarchical fashion so that one is contained in the other.
9. Mathematical Frontier of Dialectical Materialism?
We now focus on the weak postulate of materialism. What makes
topoi satisfying this condition particularly prone to reflecting the struc-
ture of Badiou’s own, ’material dialectic’ reasoning (which he then
falsely believed to be unmathematical)? In fact, it is possible to say
that the two postulates do mathematically embody the distinction be-
tween ’dialectical’ and ’democratic materialism’: that a local topos
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(where the strong postulate applies) is ’democratic’ in the sense that
there is only one dominant and thus ’general’ will (T ) materialized in
sets. Or as Badiou says, it is a topos where ’existence = individual =
body’.
This is, of course, very different from Deleuze’s view of democracy
even if Badiou particularly mentions Deleuze in this context. Indeed, as
opposed to post-structuralism, in a local topos there is only one body
of truth whereas a Grothendieck-topos articulates the incoherence of
bodies (at least tentatively).
An atomic world thus prohibits subjective torsion as opposed to
weakly materialist one where the ’fundamental law of the subject’ con-
stitutive to Badiou’s view on mathematics no longer applies. Precisely
by allowing torsion but regulating the object by categorical means, a
Grothendieck-topos gives rise to an alternative notion of truth that
should be taken as a mathematical basis for Badiou’s ’material dialec-
tic’.
Thus far we have postponed the formal definition of Grothendieck-
topoi, even if such structures were considered while phrasing the weak
postulate. There are two ways—set-theoretically material and categor-
ically abstract—ways to introduce that concept. To begin with the first
definition, sheaves are defined in relation to three operators: compati-
bility, order and localization. In the case of a traditional (ontological)
topological space X , a sheaf is just a presheaf F ∈ S ets(X) satisfying
compatibility condition. This definition of a sheaf applicable to a locale
(X) has, however, a flaw. Rather than there being an externally given
poset of localizations (eg. (X)) once and for all, we need to consider
a multitude of such posets which are more or less compatible due to
’torsion’.
Grothendieck followed this insight while he worked on e´tale-theory:
he didn’t reject the possibility of torsion in general while he still man-
aged to consider algebraic structure in a material enough way to relate
them to set theory, that is, to allow them to materialize a more ’tra-
ditional’ outlook on algebraic geometry which would be applicable at
least locally in respect to a given hierarchy or domination. In other
words, Grothendieck-topologies became to provide suitable ’snapshots’
that were locally constrained, hierarchical—this allowed local sites to
be dealt with logically without prohibiting torsion on the global scale.
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This technique proved helpful in multiple settings. In general topos the-
ory, the entire notion of topology is consequentially replaced whereas
Grothendieck’s work on e´tale-theory still requires a (set-theoretically)
material, even if altered definition of topology. The latter in fact al-
lows the ’immaterial’, that is, the torsion of the subject to materialize
in a way that is not only categorically abstract but consequential to
Badiou’s own, ’ontological’ world of reason.
To formalize this trade-off between algebra and geometry, Grothendieck
solved the problem of torsion—the treatment of the immaterial— by
means that are locally hierarchical, that is, they are (only) locally com-
patible with Badiou’s strong postulate. Each such a hierarchical corre-
late is a so called sieve, while the topology as a whole combines a syn-
thesis over an entire class of them. Namely, a sieve is a structure that
concerns coverings Ui → X (of non-monic, that is, non-injective neigh-
bourhoods) but whose index-category is subject to ’partial’ or ’local’
hierarchies or filters—precisely the sieves. To contrast these structures
with Badiou’s reduced setting in which the question of a priori is still
overshadowed by an ’analytic’, dominant hierarchy or sieve, this in-
dexing is retroactive or ’synthetic’ and may combine multiple mutually
incompatible hierarchies. It is external to the underlying ’ontological’,
set-theoretic structure.
9.1. Definition (Material definition). A Grothendieck-topology J on a
category C associates a collection J(C) of sieves on C to every object
C ∈ C , that is, it is a downward closed covering families on C (see
definition 6.4).
9.2. Remark. If U → X lies in J(C), then any arrow V → U → X
has to reside there as well. Thus, the association law makes any sieve
a right ideal. In general, if the functor y : C → Hom(·, C) : C → S ets
is considered as a presheaf y : C → S etsC
op
, then a sieve is a subobject
S ⊂ y(C) in the category of presheaves S etsC
op
.
9.3. Definition (Closed sieve). A sieve S on C is called closed if and
only if for all arrows f : D → C, the pull-back f ∗M ∈ J(D) implies
f ∈M , which in turn implies that f ∗M is the maximal sieve on D.
9.4. Remark. Similar structures are employed in the case of Cohen’s
procedure, and thus also in the Being and Event. The so called ’correct
sets’ ♀ ∈ C are closed similarly to sieves: whenever p ∈ ♀ and q ≤ p,
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then q ∈ ♀. If such a ’multiple’ ♀ is ’generic’— that is, if it intersects
every domination—it ’covers’ the whole space.
9.5.Definition (Subobject classifier). For a Grothendieck-site S hvs(C , J),
we can be define a subobject-classifier as
Ω(C) = the set of closed sieves on C,
which, in fact, is not only a presheaf but a sheaf since the condition of
closedness in the category of presheaves, Ω could be defined to consist
of all sieves. In the context of Being and Event, we can consider the
subobject-classifier as set of ’generic’ filters relative to S.
9.6. Remark. In fact, given a sieve S on C, one may define a closure of
S as62
S¯ = {h | h has a codomain C, and S covers h}.
.
The closure operation is actually organic to the categorical definition
of topology in elementary theory. In general, one defines topology in
respect to the subobject-classifier Ω as an arrow j : Ω→ Ω with j2 = j,
j ◦ true = true and j ◦ ∧ = ∧ ◦ (j × j), where the morphism true is
a unique map 1 → Ω related to the definition of an elementary topos
(see definition 10.2).
As we pointed out above, in the Logics of Worlds Badiou63 himself
defines a Grothendieck-topology when he demonstrates the existence
of the ’transcendental functor’64, that is, the sheaf-object on the basis
of a transcendental grading T . Badiou65 defines the ’territory of p’ as
K(p) = {Θ | Θ ⊂ T and p = ΣΘ}.
They form a basis of a Grothendieck-topology. In short, every territory
gives a sieve if it is completed under ≤-relation of T .
9.7. Remark. To formalise the compatibility conditions that Badiou’s
proof requires, let me define these in terms of a Grothendieck-topology.
A sieve S is called a cover of an object C if S ∈ J(C). Let P :
C op → S ets be any presheaf (functor). Then a matching family for S
of elements of P is a function which for each arrow f : D → C in S
assigns an element xf ∈ P (D) such that xf ◦g = xfg for all g : E → D.
The so called amalgamation of such a matching family is an element
x ∈ P (C) for which x◦f = xf . In Badiou’s terminology, such matching
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families are regarded as pairwise compatible subsets of an object. An
amalgamation—a ’real’ element incorporating an atom does not need
to exist. P is defined as a sheaf when they do so uniquely for all
C ∈ C and sieves S ∈ J(C). In Badiou’s example, a matching family
{xf | f ∈ Θ ⊂ T} corresponds to an atom
π(a) = Σ{Id(a, xf ) | f ∈ Θ},
and this is precisely what we established in the above proof of the
sheaf-condition66.
The topology with a basis formed by ’territories’ on p is, in fact,
subcanonical in the category of the elements of T where arrows are the
order-relations. This is because for any p ∈ T one has HomT (q, p) =
{fqp | q ≤ p}, and therefore as a set hp = {q | q ≤ p} becomes canoni-
cally indexed by T . This makes hp bijective to a subset of T . Now for
any territory Θ on p, a matching family of such subsets hq are obvi-
ously restrictions of hp. In general, for a presheaf P we can construct
another presheaf which can then be completed as a sheaf, that is, it can
be sheafified in order to give rise to the uniqueness condition of ’atoms’
similar to that discussed in Logics of Worlds. Sheaves can always be
replaced by presheaves and vice versa in practical calculations.
10. Diagrammatic, Abstract Topos
As we have now discussed the definition of the more basic structure
of Grothendieck-topoi, let us now focus on the more abstract, elemen-
tary definition of a topos and discuss (weak) materiality then in this
categorical context. The materiality of being can, indeed, be defined in
a way that makes no material reference to the category of S ets itself.
The stakes between being and materiality are thus reverted. From
this point of view, a Grothendieck-topos is not one of sheaves over
sets but, instead, it is a topos which is not defined based on a specific
geometric morphism E → S ets—a materialization—but rather a one
for which such a materialization exists only when the topos itself is
already intervened by an explicitly given topos similar to S ets . There-
fore, there is no need to start with set-theoretic structures like sieves
or Badiou’s ’generic’ filters. At the same time, the strong postulate
receives a categorical version:
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10.1. Definition (Strong Postulate, Categorical Version). For a given
materialization the situation E is faithful to the atomic situation of
truth (S etsγ∗(Ω)
op
) if the materialization morphism itself is bounded
and thus logical.
In particular, this alternative definition suggests that materiality it-
self is not inevitably a logical question67.
Therefore, for this definition to make sense, let us look at the ques-
tion of materiality from a more abstract point of view: what are topoi
or ’places’ of reason that are not necessarily material or where the ques-
tion of materiality differs from that defined against the ’Platonic’ world
of S ets? Can we deploy the question of materiality without making
any reference—direct or sheaf-theoretic—to the question of what the
objects ’consist of’, that is, can we think about materiality without
crossing Kant’s categorical limit of the object? Elementary theory sug-
gests that we can.
10.2. Definition (Elementary Topos). An elementary topos E is a
category which
1) has finite limits, or equivalently E has so called pull-backs and
a terminal object 168,
2) is Cartesian closed, which means that for each object X there is
an exponential functor (−)X : E → E which is right adjoint to
the functor (−)×X69, and finally
3) (axiom of truth) E retains an object called the subobject classifier
Ω, which is equipped with an arrow 1
true
// Ω such that for each
monomorphism σ : Y →֒ X in E , there is a unique classifying
map ϕσ : X → Ω making σ : Y →֒ X a pull-back
70 of ϕσ along
the arrow true.
10.3. Remark (Grothendieck-topos). In respect to this categorical defi-
nition, a Grothendieck-topos is a topos with the following conditions (J.
Giraud)71 satisfies: (1) E has all set-indexed coproducts, and they are
disjoint and universal, (2) equivalence relations in E have universal co-
equalisers. (3) every equivalence relation in E is effective, and every epi-
morphism in E is a coequaliser, (4) E has ’small hom-sets’, i.e. for any
two objectsX, Y , the morphisms of E fromX to Y are parametrized by
a set, and finally (5) E has a set of generators (not necessarily monic in
respect to 1 as in the case of locales). Together the five conditions can
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be taken as an alternative definition of a Grothendieck-topos (compare
to definition 6.4), and therefore also to the weak postulate.
We should still demonstrate that Badiou’s world of T -sets is actually
the category of sheaves S hvs(T, J) and that it will, consequentially,
hold up to those conditions of a topos listed above. To shift to the
categorical setting, one first needs to define a relation between objects.
These relations, the so called ’natural transformations’ we encountered
in relation Yoneda lemma, should satisfy conditions Badiou regards as
’complex arrangements’.
10.4.Definition (Relation). A relation from the object (A, Idα) to the
object (B, Idβ) is a map ρ : A→ B such that
Eβ ρ(a) = Eα a and ρ(a I p) = ρ(a) I p.
10.5. Proposition. It is a rather easy consequence of these two pre-
suppositions that it respects the order relation ≤ one retains
Idα(a, b) ≤ Idβ(ρ(a), ρ(b))
and that if a‡b are two compatible elements, then also ρ(a)‡ρ(b)72. Thus
such a relation itself is compatible with the underlying T -structures.
Given these definitions, regardless of Badiou’s73 confusion about the
structure of the ’power-object’, it is safe to assume that Badiou has
demonstrated that there is at least a category of T -S ets if not yet a
topos. Its objects are defined as T -sets situated in the ’world m’74 to-
gether with their respective equalization functions Idα. It is obviously
Badiou’s ’diagrammatic’ aim to demonstrate that this category is a
topos and, ultimately, to reduce any ’diagrammatic’ claim of ’demo-
cratic materialism’ to the constituted, non-diagrammatic objects such
as T -sets. That is, by showing that the particular set of objects is a
categorical makes him assume that every category should take a sim-
ilar form: a classical mistake of reasoning referred to as affirming the
consequent. In the next section, we discuss Badiou’s struggles regard-
ing this affair. This is not only a technical issue but philosophically
alarming as well.
11. Badiou’s Diagrammatic Struggle
Confusing general topoi with specific locales, Badiou then believes to
have overcome the need to work categorically, through ’diagrams’, and
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he again returns to his secure, ’Platonic’ basis. Thus he believes to have
reverted the course of topos theory by bringing categorical reasoning
back down to set theory. By this he inevitably strikes the notion of
’diagrams’ utilized not only by mathematicians but by several ’post-
structuralists’ after the term was first launched by Michel Foucault75.
However, he not only makes a converse error but also struggles in the
way he treats his own, specific category. No question his erudition in
categorical diagrammatics is deficient.
For example, when it comes to the actual ’mathemes’ in this category
of T -S ets , he demonstrates that there exists an object which he calls an
’exponent’ of a relation X → Y . In other words, ’[i]f we consider [. . . ]
two Quebecois in turn as objects of the world, we see that they each
entertain a relation to each of the objects linked together by the ’Oka
incident’ [. . . ] and, by the same token, a relation to this link itself, that
is a relation to a relation’76. In diagrammatic terms, Badiou77 defines a
relation to be ”universally exposed’ if given two distinct expositions of
the same relation, there exists between the two exponents [sic] one and
only one relation such that the diagram remains commutative’, and for
that he draws the following diagram:
Exponent 1
}}④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④④
④
))❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚❚
❚❚
Exponent 2
uu❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
❥❥❥
unique relation
oo
!!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈
Object 1
Exposed relation
// Object 2.
On the basis of this diagram, Badiou78 argues that if the previous
diagram with the ’progressive Qubebecois citizen’ (Exponent 1) was
similarly exposed also with another, ’progressive citizen’ (Exponent 2),
then ’if the reactionary supports the progressive, who in turn supports
the Mohawks, there follows a flagrant contradiction with the direct rela-
tion of vituperation that the reactionary entertains with the Mohawks’.
The claims is unwarranted: Badiou falsely argues for the necessity of
its non-commutativity, even if it were possible, thus again confusing
the necessary and the sufficient.
11.1.Proposition. Badiou’s condition of universal exposition is falsely
sta-ted. Given any relation f : X → Y , it is easy to construct an
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object that does not satisfy Badiou’s universality condition in almost
any topos, in particular in S ets.
Proof. To illustrate, let us assume that T = Tfalse<true so that we actu-
ally work in the category of S ets and can treat its ’elements’ point-wise.
For example, we can consider the diagram with π1, π2 denoting the two
projection maps of the Cartesian product X ×X → X ,
X ×X ×X
pi1

pi2
&&▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼
h?
//❴❴❴❴❴❴ X ×X ×X
f◦pi1
xxqq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
f◦pi2

X
f
// Y.
It is clear that the third component of the map h—namely the map
π3 ◦ h ◦ ι3—can be defined arbitrarily because in any of the maps with
the domain X ×X ×X there are no references to the third projection-
component. The only condition concerns the first component of h: it
has to satisfy specific conditions with respect to the second component
in the image of the map h. In other words, in Badiou’s definition a
relation is never universally exposed as long as there is enough room
to play such as in the case of the category of S ets .
There is further terminological confusion. This regards to how Ba-
diou assumes the object to ’expose’ a single relation. As such his ’ex-
ponent’ obviously contradicts with the standard definition of category
theory, considering it as the object XY of all relations between X and
Y instead of exposing only a particular relation, say f : X → Y . 
In short, Badiou’s exponents are graphs in conventional terminology.
The correct form of exposition—should it follow Badiou’s reasoning in
the case of the Quebecois—would then be that a relation is universally
exposed by a particular object Γf so that whenever another object Z
also exposes the relation, there is a unique arrow Z → Γf , which in turn
makes the diagram to commute. What is even more severe, however, is
that Badiou forgets to specify that discussed object Γf (Fρ in Badiou’s
example) up to an isomporphism—to specify what makes it structurally
unique. It is this unique isomorphism class which should satisfy a so
called universal property to specify it. The universal exposition of the
relation f is not just a property of the relation alone but a particular
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’universal object’ in respect to that relation f ; in the above example
it defines not any possible citizen but a unique form of a ’universal
citizen’ associated with the particular relation of the ’Oka incident’—
call it ΓOka incident.
11.2. Remark. This inability to define what precisely is ’universal’ in the
object specified by the universal condition demonstrates that Badiou’s
understanding of what is specific to category theory is faulty. In other
words, he fails to follow that precise ’Kantian’ shift that doesn’t spec-
ify objects directly, as what they are, but diagrammatically, in regard
to how they relate. Such ’universal properties’ are typical to mod-
ern mathematics in various branches, and they were used even before
category theory was first introduced but as its structural precursors in-
stead. Such universal properties then become the key to mathematics
when dealt with from the categorical point of view. Badiou by contrast
could not but denounce the diagrammatic approach in advance, even if
he then falsely concluded to have ’shown’ that the ’same mathematics’
were still going on.
For example, the first condition in the general definition of an elemen-
tary topos E requires there to exist finite limits79 but this is equivalent
to there existing a so called terminal object and pull-backs:
11.3. Definition (Pull-back). For any given two arrows f : X → Z
and g : Y → Z, a pull-back of those is an object X ×Z Y such that the
inner diagram commutes if it satisfies the following universal condition:
if the following diagram commutes, every arrow u : W → X ×Z Y is
unique up to an isomorphism.
W
  
''
u
$$
X ×Z Y
q

p
// X
f

Y
g
// Z.
11.4. Proposition (Exposition of a Singler Relation). The corrected
version of Badiou’s universal ’exposition’ of a particular relation now
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comes back to saying that there exists a pull-back
(1) Fρ = Γρ:A→B
g

✤
✤
✤
f
//❴❴❴ X
ρ

B
1B
B
in the category of T -S ets.
11.5. Remark. With only a few more complications Badiou’ proof of
above proposition could easily be achieved by showing that any pull-
back does exist. This would, in fact, complete the proof of the first
condition of an elementary topos (definition 10.2). This may follow
steps similar to the demonstration of the existence of a graph: some-
thing Badiou does manage to accomplish.
Partial proof. Badiou phrases the universal condition mistakenly and
doesn’t account to its uniqueness. He demonstrates only the existence
of such a graph whereas uniqueness would need a corrected definition
of a universal property. The proof of existence follows by first demon-
strating that normal Cartesian product exists: ’[g]iven two multiples
A and B appearing in a world, the product of these two sets, that is
the set constituted by all the ordered pairs of elements of A and B (in
this order), must also appear in this world’80. The next step consists
of showing for a relation ρ : (A, Idα)→ (B, Idβ) that the multiple con-
sisting of pairs (x, ρ(x)) ⊂ A× B, denoted by Fρ is a multiple itself
81,
and if equipped with a map ν : Fρ → T , where
ν((a, ρ(a)), (b, ρ(b))) = Idα(a, b) ∧ (ρ(a), ρ(a
′)),
this map satisfies the conditions of a transcendental indexing82
ν(x, y) ∧ ν(y, z) ≤ ν(x, z).
To show that Fρ is an object, one is thus required to show that ’[e]very
atom is real’83. Given an atom ǫ : Fρ → T Badiou
84 constructs a map
ǫ∗ : a 7→ ǫ(a, ρ(a)) : A→ T , which is an atom since ǫ satisfies the corre-
sponding conditions. Hence by the ’postulate of materialism’ it is real;
say ǫ∗(x) = Idα(c, x). But now ǫ(x, ρ(x)) = ν[(c, ρ(c)), (x, ρ(x))] which
proves Badiou’s Lemma 4. By his Lemma 5, Badiou then demonstrates
that the diagram (1) is valid: ’[t]he object (Fρ, ν) is an exponent of the
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relation ρ’, which follows by showing that ’f and g conserve localiza-
tions’, ie. f(a I p) = f(a) I p and g(a I p) = g(a) I p; and that
(a, ρ(a)) I p = a I p. Because of the definition of Fp it is easy to see
(using set theory) that it satisfies the universality condition of the pull-
back diagram (1, p. 36) and thus Badiou85 is left to show only that it
similarly ’conserves existences and localizations’.

12. T -sets Form a Topos—A Corrected Proof
We need to close up the discussion regarding the ’logical completeness
of the world’86 by showing that his world of T -sets does indeed give rise
to a topos.
12.1. Theorem. Badiou’s world consisting of T -S ets—in other words
pairs (A, Id) where Id : A× A→ T satisfies the particular conditions
in respect to the complete Heyting algebra structure of T—is ’logically
closed’, that is, it is an elementary topos. It thus encloses not only
pull-backs but also the exponential functor. These make it possible for it
to internalize a Badiou’s infinity arguments that operate on the power-
functor and which can then be expressed from insde the situation despite
its existential status.
Proof. We need to demonstrate that Badiou’s world is a topos. Rather
than beginning from Badiou’s formalism of T -sets, we refer to the stan-
dard mathematical literature based on which T -sets can be regarded as
sheaves over the particular Grothendieck-topology on the category T :
there is a categorical equivalence between T -sets satisfying the ’postu-
late of materialism’ and S hvs(T, J). The above complications Badiou
was caught up with while seeking to ’Platonize’ the existence of a topos
thus largely go in vain. We only need to show that S hvs(T, J) is a
topos.
Consider the adjoint sheaf functor that always exists for the category
of presheaves
Idα : S ets
C op → S hvs(C op, J),
where J is the canonical topology. It then amounts to an equivalence
of categories. Thus it suffices to replace this category by the one con-
sisting of presheaves S etsT
op
. This argument works for any category
C rather than the specific category related to an external complete
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Heyting algebra T . In the category of S ets define Y X as the set of
functions X → Y . Then in the category of presheaves S etsC
op
Y X(U) ∼= Hom(hU , Y
X) ∼= Hom(hU ×X, Y ),
where hU is the representable sheaf hU(V ) = Hom(V, U). The adjunc-
tion on the right side needs to be shown to exist for all sheaves—not
just the representable ones. The proof then follows by an argument
based on categorically defined limits whose existence is almost a trivial
task87. It can also be verified directly that the presheaf Y X is actually
a sheaf.
Finally, for the existence of the subobject-classifier ΩS etsCop
88, it can
be defined as
ΩS etsCop (U) ∼= Hom(hU ,Ω) ∼= {sub-presheaves of hU} ∼= {sieves on U},
or alternatively, for the category of proper sheaves S hvs(C , J), as
ΩS hvs(C ,J)(U) = {closed sieves on U}.
Here it is worth reminding ourselves that the topology on T is defined
by a basis K(p) = {Θ ⊂ T | ΣΘ = p}. Therefore, in the case of
T -sets satisfying the strong ’postulate of materialism’, Ω(p) consists
of all sieves S (downward dense subsets) of T bounded by relation
ΣS ≤ p. These sieves are further required to be closed. A sieve S with
an envelope ΣS = s is closed if for any other r ≤ s, ie. for all r ≤ s,
one has the implication
f ∗rs(S) ∈ J(r) =⇒ frs ∈ S,
where frs : r → s is the unique arrow in the poset category. In partic-
ular, since ΣS = s for the topology whose basis consists of territories
on s, we have the equation 1∗s(S) = f
∗
ss(S) = S ∈ J(s). Now the condi-
tion that the sieve is closed implies 1s ∈ S. This is only possible when
S is the maximal sieve on s—namely it consists of all arrows r → s
for r ≤ s. In such a case it is easily verified that S itself is closed.
Therefore, in this particular case
Ω(p) = {↓ (s) | s ≤ p} = {hs | s ≤ p}.
It is no more difficult to verify that this is indeed a sheaf whose all amal-
gamations are ’real’ in the sense of Badiou’s postulate of materialism.
Thus it retains a suitable T -structure.
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Let us assume now that we are given an object A, which is basically
a functor and thus a T -graded family of subsets A(p). For there to
exist a sub-functor B →֒ A comes down to stating that B(p) ⊂ A(p)
for each p ∈ T . For each q ≤ p, we also have an injection B(q) →֒ B(p)
compatible (through the subset-representation with respect to A) with
the injections A(q) →֒ B(q). For any given x ∈ A(p), we can now
consider the set
ϕp(x) = {q | q ≤ p and x I q ∈ B(q)}.
This is a sieve on p because of the compatibility condition for injections,
and it is furthermore closed since the map x 7→ Σϕp(x) is in fact an
atom (exercise) and thus retains a real representative b ∈ B. Then it
turns out that ϕp(x) =↓ (Eb). We now possess a transformation of
functors ϕ : A → Ω which is natural (diagrammatically compatible).
But in such a case we know that B →֒ A is in turn the pull-back along
ϕ of the arrow true:
B // _

1
true

A
ϕ
// Ω.
It is an easy exercise to show that this map satisfies the universal
condition of a pull-back. Indeed, let θ : A → Ω be another natural
transformation making the diagram commute. Given x ∈ A(p) and
q → p, the pull-back-condition means that x I q ∈ B(q) if and only if
θ(x I q) = trueq, but by naturality of θ this is same as saying θp(x) I q =
trueq. That in turn means (q → p) ∈ θq(x). Therefore, as sets, ϕq(x) =
θq(x). This concludes our sketch that true : 1 →֒ Ω associating to
each singleton of 1(p) the maximal sieve ↓ (p) makes Ω the subobject
classifier of the category S etsT
op
. This is equivalent to the category of
T -S ets . 
13. Conclusion—Badiou Inside Out
In the fourth and the final book of the ’Greater Logic’—the first
part of the Logics of Worlds—Badiou attempts to conduct the proof
demonstrated above. This proof constitutes the ’analytic’ of the in-
quiry ’bearing only on the transcendental laws of being there’, or in
other words ’the theory of worlds, the elucidation of most abstract
laws of that which constitutes a world qua general form [sic] of appear-
ing’. However, Badiou fails to make the required verifications in order
to support the claim for ’generality’ that, he believes, denounces the
relevance of categorical being(-there)89. Instead, Badiou affirms the
consequent immersed in his own place to begin with, that is, he adopts
a locally (and logically) bounded, reductive approach90 to topos theory.
If Badiou’s dialectics then aims to bridge the ’analytics’ (Logics of
Worlds) with ’dialectics’ (Being and Event), the phrase ’analytic’ refers
exactly to the strong, initially bounding condition of the constitutive,
atomic postulate of materialism. Similar boundaries do not apply to
’weak materialism’ and, therefore, the materially weak Grothendieck-
topoi could be taken as metaphorical characterizations of Badiou’s own,
’material dialectic’ philosophy. Grothendieck, early on, approached the
mathematical a priori from a more synthetic, read Kantian perspec-
tive (as a variety of sieves and fibres) whereas Badiou assumes such
hierarchies to be initial and dominant, all-encompassing gradings of
transcendence.
The postulate of materialism then proves out to be a split postulate,
and thus its meaning is very different in non-split situations. Only in
the quasi-split91 situation of a locale do the two conditions of mate-
riality coalesce. This in turn seems to contradict with Badiou’s other
maxim: if dialectics understands ’truths as exceptions’, these excep-
tions need to be understood in terms of the ’most abstract laws’. This
is because the ’objective domain of their emergence [. . . ] cannot yet
attain the comprehension of the terms that singularize materialist di-
alectic [. . . ] and subjects as the active forms of these exceptions’92.
Badiou’s struggle with ’diagrammatics’ thus makes his own under-
standing of these ’abstract laws’ flawed precisely because they can, as
opposed to what Badiou claims, be thought mathematically. Indeed,
Badiou’s own understanding of the materialist truth becomes mathe-
matically exceptional and split : it is based either on the primacy of
the split concept of truth (the axiom of choice in the Being and Event)
or the quasi-split materialization of force as demonstrated by his fun-
damental law of the subject93. It is Badiou who forces us to choose:
’mathematics or poem’ and thus assumes the question of mathematics
to split world’s domains of appearance into two.
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At the same time, Badiou fails to attest his own dialectic maxim,
for there is no reason to exempt mathematics from his rule of excep-
tions: that ’[t]here are bodies and languages, except that there are
truths’94. This applies to the world of mathematics. In particular, its
embodiment in set theory is exceptional not only because it bounds
its truth logically—as a split, two-valued choice characterizing a global
hierarchy—but because there is only, and essentially, one instance of
such bodies. There are no ’bodies and languages’ but, as the name of
Badiou’s second endeavour suggests, the ’worlds’ are multiple only in-
sofar as their ’logics’ or languages differ. The materiality of mathemat-
ics in this sense appears to be ’democratic’ only from within Badiou’s
inside-out reading.
To Badiou, there is then but a single, ’affirmative proposition’95 that
declares the ’existence of a pure form of the multiple’. There is no
interaction in between; the event may never occur as things happen—
in the midst of mathematics as it emerges and takes place in the middle
of worlds. Badiou’s theory is exceptional precisely because it deals with
an event whose ’existence = individual = body’96: something to occur
only in singular; something whose communication, whatever its essence,
is bounded by formal language similarly to a situation internal to an
elementary topos but not from the outset.
Were the above-mentioned mistakes then accidental, based on an
unfortunate, restricted literature97? Was it by chance that Badiou
encounters phenomenology only in a way constrained by ’intuitionist
logic’ internal to Heyting algebras? At least, Badiou himself hardly
counts as an ’intuitionist’, for in the Being and Event he announces
that ’that intuitionism has mistaken the route in trying to apply back
onto ontology criteria of connection which come from elsewhere, and
especially from a doctrine of mentally effective operations’. He even
declares that ’intuitionism is a prisoner of the empiricist and illusory
representation of mathematical objects’98. But the reduction to lo-
cal topoi, bounded by their dialectic languages or ’logics’, could serve
another, more philosophical purpose.
Indeed, Badiou99 consequentially claims to be able to contribute
to several philosophical debates. The first problem he discusses has
been haunting philosophy since Democritus and Lucretius, who ’had
glimpsed the possibility of an infinite plurality of worlds’. Especially
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this concerns the capacity of set theory to reflect upon infinity. As Ba-
diou100 continues, to Aristotle the question of the ’arrangement of the
world [which] is essentially finite’—a problem to persist ’at the heart
of the Kantian dialectic’.
But the infinity-arguments can be studied from inside any elementary
topos, not just S ets . There is thus an infinite number of places to make
an argument about infinity. The two meanings of infinity—Badiou
refers to them as ’bodies’ and ’languages’—hardly communicate when
it comes to Badiou’s own argument. If Badiou was on the right track
then while seeking to demonstrate that the logics of worlds are, so to
say, infinite. Where he fails is in assuming only logics, not bodies, to
be mathematically infinite. Any mathematical bodies he discussed are
constrained in the finite, while makes a case that bodies should only
exist as something non-mathematical: that mathematics itself would
not count as a body. Therefore, after all, Badiou calls for a return to
Aristotle.
But there is also a second concern this train of thought illustrates—
one related to Kant indeed. Badiou101 argues that an ’object is nothing
but the legislation of appearing’. Instead of propagating a relationalist
view—as we have done throughout our categorical discussion—Badiou
rather claims that ’[t]he definition of a relation must be strictly depen-
dent on that of objects’. This is a claim that, without any reference
to an empiricist conclusion (Badiou’s experience of mathematics), sup-
ports the assumption that the purpose of Badiou’s mistake is something
more than a mere accident.
’Wittgenstein’, he indeed continues, ’having defined the ’state of af-
fairs’ as a ’combination of objects’, posits that, ’if a thing can occur
in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be writ-
ten into the thing itself”. Badiou still treats the body or the topos of
mathematics as such a ’thing’: as an object that the ’logics of worlds’
are written into instead of seeing the things or objects themselves as
they occur and occupy mathematics, that is, in relation for themselves.
Mathematics is still viewed as a stable world—as one ’fixed in its mi-
rage’ instead of allowing mathematics itself to happen and occupy its
own ’states’ in between. Its domain is still incorporeal. Language is
yet to discover the process of its own inscription.
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What is mathematics beyond the ’interior of the world’102 then? How
does it inscribe its own exteriority from inside of its own topos—to gain
a grasp of its own alternatives? Badiou could argue that, even if we
have shown that there are not only many languages but bodies (topoi)
to mathematics, the situations insternal to them would still be mute
and bounded by formal languages like Wittgenstein anticipated. They
would still behave ’logically’ if only from within. This is to say that
there still exists a language, or an amalgam of such languages, that
a topos then localizes or embodies without violating any of Badiou’s
’democratic materialist’ claims about mathematics. Even if as such
different from set theory, an elementary topos is thus a world where
mathematics happens and ’communicates’ itself largely in terms of set
theory. The ’same mathematics’ still continues, but only from the point
of view of a single topos of appearance: not between them.
Instead, when we look at those topoi as they themselves geometri-
cally interact, something occurs that suggests that they are not ma-
terially logical or bounded, even if for a specific topos (without a cat-
egorical insight) we would be unable to establish this ’immateriality’
from within. Badiou’s mistake thus comes down to precisely this sin-
gular perspective-mistake: he only cares what happens from inside a
single situation. Again, by an argument based on internal conditions
of such a topos, he would then affirm the consequent by suggesting
that no other way for situations to exist were possible: that existence
as such would necessarily be understandable only from the perspective
of subjective inwardness—the philosophical ’leitmotiv’ running from
Descartes through Hume to Hegel103. He would then overlook how two
topoi relate to each other (through the so called geometric morphisms).
But this is not the only way to contest formal language that still
appears to regulate elementary topoi if only from within. Instead,
what if we could embody structures that did not inscribe a language
into its ’thing’—not even internally? Could there be such bodies for
which the possibility of whose state of affairs were not ’written into
the thing itself’, but that could internalize the process of their own
interactions? The answer is positive: the world does authorize such
forms. Unfortunately, we cannot demonstrate this within the limits of
this paper.
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We are safe to conclude, however, that the way in which elementary
theory displaces the question of materiality does matter. Topos theory
counts as an ’expansive construction of the multiple to the multiple-
beings’104 and, like local theory, elementary theory is not exempt from
Badiou’s material dialectic rule: the category of all T op is not itself
a topos, and thus the theory of such topoi is an expansive construc-
tion. It is this theory that is not written into the thing itself insofar as
its things are topoi. Something truthful resists the existential seal of
any particular topos similarly as Russell encountered the fact that the
class of all sets is not itself a set. Unlike Badiou’s local theory, which
still has only one, single body L oc, elementary theory does incorpo-
rate an infinity of not only languages but bodies. Badiou’s ’logics of
worlds’, therefore, is only an exception amongst those ’who exist in the
world’105.
In conclusion, if Badiou defines the event negatively in respect to
mathematical regulation, he is unable to grasp how that regulation it-
self happens, for otherwise he would need to situate his own event along
with others’. The categorical process, by contrast, appears to falsify
at least one of Badiou’s two arguments: (1) that the event cannot be
formally approached or localized except by regulating its consequences ;
or (2) that formal logic is the only meta-structure, the only foundation
to regulate and intervene truth. Any one of these two propositions can
survive only given the failure of the other.
Indeed, let us assume the second postulate and treat category theory
as something non-mathematical. This comes down to saying that math-
ematically it does not exist: it fails to fulfill Badiou’s test of ’the true
in the Alternative’106—his second test of a body. This would make it
’poetic’, something external to the ’Platonic’ plane of causes (or ’plane
of consistence’ as Deleuze and Guattari discuss107) and, at the same
time, category theory itself would appear as an event. It would be ap-
proached formally but not in the sense of regulating its consequences,
which belong to the domain of logic and causation. Rather, the formal
or ’pure’ themselves would undergo change, that is, they would happen.
This suffices to demonstrate that the two statements cannot survive
in tandem. However, to understand this from the point of view of
the first statement, let us note that topos theory is a formal approach
to the event—to the ’inconsistent’ real being, as Badiou regards it.
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Elementary theory regulates embodies the event not only in the sense
of the locally reconcilable ’generic’ instance (♀) as is the case in Cohen’s
argument. In the precise, elementary sense, a topos is an amalgam
of mutually inconsistent contexts. Therefore, because topos theory is
a formal approach, the first statement suggests that it does regulate
its consequences : in other words, topos theory is consequential to the
domain of formal regulation. This appears to contradict with Badiou’s
second thesis, which argues topos theory, and category theory more
broadly, to be inconsequential from the point of view of set theory—the
’plane of consistence’. Otherwise they would make the unmathematical
formally manifest, again contradicting with the first thesis.
14. On Mathematical Studies of Science
There is no doubt about the originality of Badiou’s attempt to bridge
the gap between the philosophical and scientific discourses of materi-
alism. Not only the philosopher Badiou but Badiou as a student of
mathematics opened up a whole new box of Pandora: a new way to
approach science studies. He has a new style—a style ’in a great writer’
which, like Gilles Deleuze’s108 says, ’is always a style of life’.
He said he did not care epistemology, but it is this style that makes
him know. But much remains to be said and done. As topos theory
embodies change as it appears from inside of mathematics, we need
entirely new ways to think about ’being’ as subject to the event, the
world, and to address its own history and becoming. We need to bring
that style to mathematics: this invention of ’a possibility of life, a way
of existing’.
That history of this becoming of being runs not only through sci-
ence: it is visible in philosophy, as it runs through Descartes, Leibniz,
Spinoza, Hegel and Heidegger. Yet in many ways we live in an age
when progress is unclear. Few people today engage reason deep down
their hearts.
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